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Restricting the international supply of fossil fuels is increasingly acknowledged as a necessary part of
achieving long-term global temperature goals. However, the barriers to imposing such restrictions are
immense. Issues of economic stability, equity, and associated geo-political tensions, are particularly
acute. In theory, a managed decline can be facilitated by international cooperation. In practice, however,
despite some apparent rhetorical commitments, adequate institutional responses have not been forth-
coming. This paper highlights potentially relevant institutions, and assesses their combined contribution
to fulfilling a set of governance functions relevant to decarbonisation in this case. The analysis finds that
the governance challenges associated with deciding what fossil fuel carbon should be designated ‘un-
burnable’, and managing the associated equity-related, geo-political conflicts, are far from being fully
recognised. Potential institutional reforms, by which governance gaps could be narrowed, are identified.
These highlight the further potential of the G20, UNFCCC and WTO in particular.
Crown Copyright © 2020 Published by Elsevier B.V. This is an open access article under the CC BY license
(http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/).1. Introduction
A carbon ‘budget’ compatible with limiting global average tem-
perature rise to 2 C (let alone 1.5 C) is widely acknowledged to
require most global fossil fuel reserves to remain ‘in the ground’
(Rogelj et al., 2018); a third of oil, half of gas and over 80% of coal
reserves, by one calculation (McGlade and Ekins, 2015). A 1.5 C
pathway requires investment in fossil-fuel extraction and conversion
to decrease by around a quarter over two decades (Rogelj et al., 2018,
para 2.5.2). Between 2000 and 2014, however, such investmentmore
than tripled, and remains the largest share of world energy invest-
ment (IEA, 2016). Despite recent growth in renewable energy, fossil
fuel use is also projected to grow (IEA, 2018). A ‘wicked’ combination
of social, political, institutional, and economic factors lies behind an
on-going lock-in of fossil fuel-intensive investment. In developing
countries with large unmet energy needs especially, but also in
developed economies where fossil-fuel-oriented multinationals
generate significant wealth, extraction and trade are widely
considered central to energy security and economic development.
Given this context, climate policy at all levels, not least the in-
ternational, has focussed almost exclusively on curtailing demandevier B.V. This is an open access a
ng it in the ground? Assessi
20.100061for fossil fuel energy (and associated emissions), neglecting po-
tential interventions on the supply-side that would limit explora-
tion, extraction or transportation. It is increasingly recognised,
however, that effective action requires attention to both sides
(Green and Denniss, 2018), including reduction of generous pro-
duction subsidies, which at current levels would lead to over 37 Gt
CO2 being emitted between 2017 and 2050 that would otherwise
not occur (Gerasimchuk et al., 2017).
This selective policy attention notwithstanding, producing and
exporting countries and companies are beginning to experience
pressure to change from various sources, not necessarily policy-
related. As energy efficiency measures, substitution, and lower
cost low-carbon technologies take effect, falling demand for fossil
fuel in many regions is set to continue (IEA, 2018). The resulting
decline in oil prices has encouraged economic diversification by
producers (Tagliapietra, 2017). Investors uncertain of long-term
viability, especially if climate policy tightens, are demanding
higher returns before committing to long-cycle oil and gas projects
(OIES, 2019). Shareholder activism, the divestment movement and
climate-oriented legal actions represent further and growing
challenges with potential to prompt diversification by energy ma-
jors or steps to return money to shareholders. A small number of
national and sub-national governments have introduced re-
strictions on exploration or extraction within their jurisdictionsrticle under the CC BY license (http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/).
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and van Asselt, 2018).
Supply-side climate policy is now attracting increased attention
from scholars, policy makers and activists alike. The relevance and
potential role of international governance institutions are being
examined in a small but growing literature (see e.g. Asheim et al.,
2019; Piggot et al., 2017; Van Asselt, 2014; Van Asselt and
Kulovesi, 2017; Verkuijl et al., 2018). This literature notes how
deference to national sovereignty concerns and perceived national
interests causes relevant governance institutions to steer clear of
the supply-side agenda. While unlikely to change greatly in the
near term, it is important to understand better the underlying
dynamics and constraints, and begin to contemplate appropriate
international-level policy responses.
Against this backdrop, this paper assesses the potential of in-
ternational governance institutions to contribute to ‘supply-side’
climate policy, managing the decline of fossil fuel production, and
the extent to which it is being utilized. It does so by applying the
framework for sectoral system analysis developed in the intro-
ductory paper to this issue in which international institutions are
understood as establishing substantive rules and norms that can
prescribe, proscribe, permit or direct relevant behaviour of state
and non-state actors, and to entail procedural rules for making and
implementing related decisions (Oberthür et al. a, this issue). Trans-
national institutions are run exclusively by non-state actors, while
hybrids include both non-state and state actors/governments. To be
included, institutions should either have climate mitigation as an
explicit goal, or pursue goals and activities that significantly facil-
itate or impede mitigation efforts.
Because both extraction and current consumption levels are so
heavily reliant on subsidies, and opportunities to reduce these are
increasingly discussed, attention is given to subsidy reform. With
limited space, most consideration is given to oil and especially coal,
the most carbon-intensive fossil fuels, reduction in supply of which
is widely considered most urgent. In terms of the governance
landscape, a series of bilateral and regional economic agreements
have some relevance to energy-related decisions, but are not dis-
cussed in detail. Although fugitive emissions from production are
far from trivial, and an interesting sub-set of related transnational
or hybrid institutions has emerged to address them, here the
problem is assumed to recede once supply constraints take effect.
The paper is structured as follows. In section 2, the trans-
formation challenges and governance needs applying to the fossil
fuels extractive sector are set out, highlighting what needs to
change to deliver decarbonisation, and key barriers to those
changes. The potential benefits, in principle, of international
cooperation are set out. Potentially relevant institutions/initiatives
are then presented in section 3, followed by an assessment of their
combined effects on fulfilment of key governance functions in
section 4. Potential options for reform involving a range of in-
stitutions are sketched in section 5, and an outlook offered.
2. Transformation challenges and governance needs
2.1. Daunting barriers
The fossil fuel extractive ‘sectoral system’ presents a unique
challenge, in that climate policy imperatives require its virtual
elimination; while not without potential, carbon capture and storage
technologies cannot be deployed quickly enough at sufficient scale.
From this over-arching, fundamental challenge arise two more
specific challenges. Firstly, acceptable processes/rules throughwhich
the timing and sequencing of production phase-outs can be agreed
(including which fossil fuels to prioritise, from which locations, andPlease cite this article as: Rayner, T., Keeping it in the ground? Assessi
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a range of ‘lock-ins’ (political, institutional, economic, social) that
perpetuate fossil fuel-reliance and, to varying degrees, shut off
alternative development paths (Seto et al., 2016), must be tackled.
Some, though by no means all, could be loosened through
international-level governance interventions, even if only indirectly.
Regarding the phase-out schedule, decisions could be informed
by either efficiency or fairness principles, or some combination of
these. Prioritising economic efficiency would see continued
exploitation of the least greenhouse gas-, capital-, or resource-
intensive resources, while others remain untouched (see McGlade
and Ekins, 2015). High carbon content, relative ease of substitu-
tion and relative lack of export value suggest that action on coal
should be most rapid. Under a least-cost strategy, OECD countries
would implement a complete phase out by 2030, China (the biggest
coal producer and user) by 2040 (Climate Analytics, 2016). For oil, it
may be efficient for exploration and production to continue in
lower-cost areas (Manley et al., 2017; Tagliapietra, 2017). While
low-income countries may benefit from this, oil rents are still likely
to decline significantly due to falling prices associated with re-
ductions in demand (Manley et al., 2017).
Whether those foregoing extraction should be compensated,
and onwhat basis, is debatable, given that reduced production may
result from multiple causes (Lenferna, 2018). But a production
phase-out process not perceived as equitable will surely meet
resistance. Currently, over half of least developed and lowest in-
come countries are planning either further exploration or expan-
sion of existing production (Bradley et al., 2018). Those with
abundant reserves but slow extraction rates risk the ‘stranding’ of
much hydrocarbon wealth in the event that demand peaks and
declines in the relatively short term.
A more equitable approach could take inspiration from the
UNFCCC principle of ‘common but differentiated responsibility and
respective capabilities’, giving greater production rights to the
poorest, who have extracted and benefited least to date, and have
fewest alternative means of development (Caney, 2016). The tril-
lions in ‘foregone rents’ at stake constitute a substantial share of the
GDP ofmany countries (Kartha et al., 2016). Such rents are unevenly
distributed among countries, and also regions and individual eco-
nomic entities. That some stand to lose much more from supply-
side restrictions constitutes a huge challenge to multi-lateral ef-
forts, requiring reductions to be planned and managed over
extended periods, with alternative economic paradigms developed
for fossil-fuel-dependent regions.
As noted above, a range of ‘lock-ins’ militate against supply re-
ductions. Arguably the most important relate to the reliance of
many states on fossil fuels for their fiscal sustainability. Inability to
sustain domestic spending commitments would threaten political
legitimacy and stability in many cases. To transcend their current
status as ‘rentiers’, to become more economically diverse ‘produc-
tion states’, Middle Eastern and North African (MENA) oil exporters,
for example, must overhaul entire economic, social and political
models e even as they undergo significant demographic change
(Tagliapietra, 2017).
In contrast to private companies which can in principle diversify
or return money to shareholders, countries have considerably less
flexibility to redeploy capital. Governments own over 50% of global
fossil fuel production (80e90% of proven oil reserves) through
majority-stakes in, or fully nationalised, producing companies
(Whitley and van der Berg, 2015). These cannot be sold outright but
only licensed to companies for development (Manley et al., 2017).
For developed countries, the likelihood of ‘stranded’ assets raises
public policy concerns about financial instability and a growing
pension deficit.ng global governance for fossil-fuel supply reduction, Earth System
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asset ‘bubble’ do not appear to have diffused especially widely.1
One recent analysis warns of potential discounted global wealth
loss of $1e4 trillion e comparable to what triggered the 2007
financial crisis (Mercure et al., 2018). Lack of awareness or even
willful blindness on the part of policy makers and stakeholders to
the prospect of key assets becoming stranded e potentially by
technological changes even without tighter climate policy e and
the momentous economic consequences, may be regarded as key
barriers to contemplating a phase-down. This is reinforced by
politically powerful producer groups who, in the absence of
countervailing lobbies (Asmelash, 2017), secure preferential treat-
ment from national governments e and significant influence over
international negotiations (Corporate Accountability International,
2017). Government support includes subsidies to production,
ranging from direct payments, preferential access rights to energy
deposits, credit and insurance support, caps on liabilities, govern-
ment ownership of power generation (Koplow and Charles, 2010).
High shares for fossil energy have been sustained, evenwith falling
cost of renewables, in part by a 50% increase in subsidies from 2008
to 2018 (Climate Transparency, 2018). Estimating their full extent is
complicated, in part due to substantial data gaps because of limited
government transparency, partly to lack of consensus over what
constitutes subsidy. A full accounting of global energy subsidies (for
all types) has never been completed.2
In addition to heavy corporate influence, policy makers may also
experience pressure from civil society and trade unions from re-
gions whose well-being is particularly dependent on fossil fuel
extractive industries, concerned with the social justice implications
of any ‘phase out’. But even if political will and a degree of societal/
stakeholder acceptance could be mustered, governments may still
be impeded by a lack of bureaucratic capacity to conceive of
alternative development paths (including reforms to subsidies).
Investors, moreover, may be unwilling to invest in other sectors.2.2. Promise and potential of international cooperation
Supply-side climate policies cover, inter alia, extraction taxes,
subsidy reform, moratoria or quotas, or a reduced extraction from
public lands (Green and Dennis, 2018). The economic theory
informing much supply-side policy discourse suggests that coun-
tries cooperating to cut emissions can enhance their effectiveness
by cutting production as well as demand for fossil fuels (ibid 2018).
Without such steps, free riders in terms of mitigation effort will
benefit from cheaper fossil fuels, as market price adjusts to a
lowering of overall demand, causing cross-border ‘carbon leakage’.
Moreover, producers would likely accelerate extraction to secure
rents before demand falls significantly (the ‘green paradox’). While
national governments guard their right to govern fossil fuel
development and any related transition, international institutions
can nevertheless, at least in principle, influence behaviour,
constrain activity, and shape expectations in potentially helpful
ways (Van Asselt, 2014). By fostering greater transparency and
learning, for example, some of the lock-ins noted above could be
loosened, particularly related to subsidies. International in-
stitutions may be able to ease geo-political tensions provoked by
radical supply-side interventions.1 As noted by contributors to the 2018 Fossil Fuel Supply and Climate Policy
Oxford conference, for example, the discourse is dominated by ‘Northern’ voices.
2 According to one estimate, fossil fuel subsidies (production and consumption)
amounted to US$493 billion in 2014 (up from US$300 billion in 2009); renewable
energy receives less than a quarter (IEA, 2015). Major economies' subsidies for
exploration and extraction may be as high as $70bn annually (Bast et al., 2015).
Please cite this article as: Rayner, T., Keeping it in the ground? Assessi
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in terms of the importance and potential of five international
governance functions, as summarised in Table 1, in relation to the
challenges and barriers identified above.
The assessment is summarised in Table 2.
Guidance and signal
A consensual and deliberate phasing out of fossil fuel extractive
industries requires a common understanding of its necessity and
urgency. There is a clear need to signal at international level the
resolve of governments and others to pursue the reduction and
eventual elimination of fossil fuel production and, as part of that,
the subsidies underpinning much ‘business as usual’. Ideally,
deadlines should be attached. Such international signals will
strengthen the ‘social license’ for governments (national and sub-
national) to act (Erickson et al., 2018). Otherwise, governments,
businesses, investors and insurers will continue to support unsus-
tainable, but profitable, practices.
A strong case can also be made that some form of international
mechanism is needed to share information about carbon-related
investment risk. Informed planning by investors and coordinated
efforts to safely deflate the global carbon bubble (Mercure et al.,
2018) require that the chances (and possible timescale) of assets
losing their worth are clearly signalled. A strong international-level
signal would also help create opportunities, at multiple levels, to
think constructively about the structural changes necessary in re-
gions affected by production cuts (see also ‘Learning and knowl-
edge’ below).
Setting rules to facilitate collective action
Although voluntary/unilateral initiatives may continue to
emerge, only international-level rules will ensure that supply-side
controls reach a meaningful scale. As noted above, consensual rules
covering timing and sequencing, and the appropriateness of in-
ternational compensation, are required. Such consequential dis-
cussions over which resources should remain ‘in the ground’, and
associated questions of fairness, can only legitimately be held at
international level. Without this, less predictable, market-driven
changes will likely have de-stabilising effects.
Ideally, targets for extraction of remaining fossil fuels would be
set and implemented through a global instrument, or instruments,
recognised as equitable. Some commentators have discussed the
potential for a global-level moratorium on new coalmines
(Blondeel and van der Graaf, 2018), or fossil fuel ‘non-proliferation’
treaties to phase out the trade in coal (Newell and Simms, 2019). A
global system to allocate the bulk of GHG production rights by
regular global auction, as close as practical to the point of fossil-fuel
production, has been suggested (Tickell, 2009), potentially raising
up to V1 trillion per year for climate-related spending.
Regarding fossil-fuel subsidies (FFS), even though reform is
more likely to be triggered by domestic economic and fiscal moti-
vations, international-level action could strengthen incentives (Van
Asselt and Kulovesi, 2017), and deter reneging on any voluntary/
unilateral commitments (Asmelash, 2017). Stronger agreed defini-
tions of what actually constitutes FFS could pre-empt government
denials that they even exist, and put international institutions in a
better position to help address them. Explicit, specific commit-
ments should ideally be set out country-by-country, with certain
subsidies banned or subject to limits (ibid: 359). However, progress
through peer pressure exerted through international organisations
is more feasible (Smith and Urpeleinen, 2017).
Transparency and accountability
Any enhanced global regulation of extraction (or subsidy
thereof) would clearly require adequate monitoring andng global governance for fossil-fuel supply reduction, Earth System
Table 1
Overview of main functions of international governance institutions.
Functions Key features Main added value
Guidance & Signal  Results from overall agreement, including targets/
objectives
 Aligns actors across countries
Setting Rules  Various forms of obligations and standards  Enables action by addressing interdependence & competitiveness concerns
Transparency &
Accountability
 Reporting, review/verification, compliance  Contributes to effective reciprocity and implementation (addressing free riding)
& mutual trust
Means of Implementation  Capacity building, technology transfer and finance
(North-South)
 Facilitates pooling of donors/investors' resources and reducing transaction costs
Knowledge & Learning  Generation and collective appraisal of information/
knowledge
 Science and policy learning
 Improved and shared understanding (authoritative knowledge)
 Improved policies (learning)
Source: Oberthür et al. (this issue).
Table 2
International governance requirements by function.
FUNCTION Guidance and
Signal
Setting Rules Transparency and
Accountability
Means of
Implementation
Knowledge and
Learning
Importance High High Medium
High (FFS reform)
Medium-High High
Detail of
need
 Signal phase out of fossil
fuel extraction e to be
completed ASAP after
2050
 Signal phase out of fossil
fuel subsidies by firm
deadline
 Share information about
climate-related invest-
ment risk
 Create opportunities to
consider how to embark
on structural change
 Global regulation of
extraction rights/timing
and sequencing of phase-
out
 Compensatory measures
for developing countries,
where deemed
appropriate
 Define what constitutes
FFS
 Rules on FFS phase down/
out
 Global regulation requires
monitoring/verifying
implementation (but
activities possess
relatively high intrinsic
transparency).
 Internationally
comparable (FFS) data to
facilitate learning and
evaluation of progress,
creating peer pressure,
enable comparisons.
 Technical and financial
support for national
reform efforts (transition
away from extractive
industry, FFS reform
efforts)
 To raise awareness of
carbon bubble/stranded
asset risk
 Enhance policy learning
r.e. damaging effects of
existing practices,
benefits of alternative
development paths.
Source: author's compilation. Unless otherwise stated, the strength of need is the same for the broader issue of phasing down extractive industries and for FFS reform.
T. Rayner / Earth System Governance xxx (xxxx) xxx4verification. Given the nature of the extractive industries, techni-
cally this would not be difficult. In the current context, the issue is
most pressing for FFS reform efforts. While domestic reforms can
proceed without it, internationally comparable data can facilitate
valuable lesson learning and evaluation, creating peer pressure and
enabling comparisons of the effectiveness of different interventions
(Whitley and van der Burg, 2015) (cf. the knowledge and learning
function). It can also bring favouritism towards particular groups to
the attention of potential countervailing lobbies, spurring national-
level reforms. Mandatory reporting (following theWTO agriculture
example) is conceivable in principle. Action on transparency can
also be widened and strengthened if progressive governments
insist on inclusion of subsidy reform in (bilateral or multilateral)
trade agreements (ibid).
Capacity building, technology and finance (means of
implementation)
Whilst many rich producers have the capacity to engineer their
own transformations (should domestic social/political conditions
allow), for many countries ambitious transitions away from reli-
ance on extractive industries will require significant technical and
financial support from the international level. The current lack of
investment in the private sectors of MENA countries, for example,
could be remedied by more strategic investment by sovereign
wealth funds (Tagliapietra, 2017). This could benefit from
international-level coordination. Conceivably, funds generated by
the kind of revenue-raising systems mentioned above could be
allocated to this function. Countries could also be supported in
boosting analytical capacity within their bureaucracies to conceive
of and chart alternative development paths (backed by credible,
strong international ‘guidance and signal’ - see above). Similarly,
there is a strong need for technical and financial support from thePlease cite this article as: Rayner, T., Keeping it in the ground? Assessi
Governance, https://doi.org/10.1016/j.esg.2020.100061international level in terms of enabling FFS reform (Whitley and
van der Burg, 2015).
Knowledge and learning
As noted above, lack of awareness of the threat of stranded as-
sets and the benefits that may be associated with radical new
development pathways acts as a serious impediment to action.
Increasing such awareness may be regarded as a critical early pri-
ority for international efforts. Producing knowledge that is widely
recognised as legitimate is a major source of influence for inter-
national organisations (Van der Graaf andWestphal, 2011). There is
a strong case for the involvement of international-level institutions
in stimulating relevant (cross-national) learning processes in na-
tional institutions that may otherwise lack analytical capacity and
continue to assume that fossil fuel extraction furthers development
goals, despite evident environmental, social and political side-
effects. Learning regarding these side-effects could potentially
also be promoted through internationally mandated impact as-
sessments (Healy et al., 2019). In time, such learning could shift
engrained perceptions of the ‘national interest’. New knowledge
about FFS, particularly regarding environmental and socioeco-
nomic effects, could allow reform to be framed as a means to
release resources for alternative purposes (Skovgaard and van
Asselt, 2018).
3. Governance supply
Awide array of international governance institutions influence
the behaviour of state and non-state actors regarding extraction,
and of governments in terms of production subsidies. A single,
dominant institution, however, is lacking. The most relevant in-
stitutions were identified by reviewing established databases andng global governance for fossil-fuel supply reduction, Earth System
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mental/international organisations are described, before a num-
ber of transnational/hybrid initiatives are touched on. The results
are summarised in (see online supplemental material).3.1. Intergovernmental/international organisations (IOs) and fora
Given the political sensitivities noted in previous sections, the
UNFCCC approaches fossil-fuel supply issues only obliquely. Article
4.8, however (covering adverse effects of response measures),
mentions ‘countries whose economies are highly dependent on
income generated from the production, processing and export, and/
or on consumption of fossil fuels and associated energy-intensive
products’ as one type of actor potentially adversely affected by
‘response measures’ that target carbon emissions. It notes funding
and technology transfer as potential actions to meet these coun-
tries' specific needs.
The Paris Agreement (PA) (UNFCCC, 2015a)makes nomention of
fossil fuels, leaving states to develop policies and measures tailored
to national circumstances. For reasons elaborated below, however,
it is possible to interpret the mandates of both the UNFCCC and PA
as encompassing fossil fuel supply (Piggot et al., 2017). Moreover,
COP21 adopted a work programme on the impact of response
measures comprising: (1) economic diversification and trans-
formation; and (2) just transition of the workforce, and the creation
of decent work and quality jobs (Decision 11/CP.21, paragraph 5).
For its part, the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change
(IPCC) contributes especially to the knowledge and learning func-
tion, facilitating assessments of ‘unburnable’ carbon. Also at UN
level are the Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs), Goal 7 of
which highlights access to affordable, reliable, sustainable, and
modern energy, Goal 12 responsible production and consumption,
and Goal 13 tackling climate change (though without mentioning
fossil fuel production explicitly).
Several IOs, including the International Energy Agency (IEA), the
International Energy Forum, OPEC, the Gas Exporting Countries
Forum and the Energy Charter Treaty, bring together energy pro-
ducers and consumers in various configurations (Van Asselt,
2014).3
Along with other multilateral development banks (MDBs) and
export credit agencies, the World Bank Group (WBG) potentially
has an important direct role by either financing fossil fuel
(extraction) projects or choosing not to. The WTO remains the only
multilateral organisation to administer a legally binding agreement
on subsidies. Its disciplines on subsidies, and in particular the WTO
Agreement on Subsidies and Countervailing Measures (SCM), are
relevant.
Given the unwillingness to transfer substantial authority over
energy issues to formal multilateral settings, informal and high-
level forums, the G7 and G20 play a major role, ensuring contin-
uous dialogue and deliberation (Van der Graaf andWestphal, 2011).
Both have committed to reduce FFS. The G20 (2009) commitment
to phasing out ‘inefficient’ FFS (while protecting the most vulner-
able) and encouraging related national strategies inspired a sub-
sequent, regional-level agreement by the Asia Pacific Economic
Cooperation (APEC). Moreover, the G20 gave the OECD and IEA a
specific mandate (alongwith OPEC and theWorld Bank) to research
the scale and impacts of FFS as well as experiences with reform.
Along with the International Monetary Fund (IMF), the OECD and
IEA are among the IOs most concerned with reducing FFS.3 The Energy Charter Treaty is designed to facilitate investments and trade in
energy among around 50 Eurasian exporter and importer signatories.
Please cite this article as: Rayner, T., Keeping it in the ground? Assessi
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An emerging field of NGO/civil society initiatives should be
noted, including the Lofoten Declaration (2017), demanding an
organised withdrawal from fossil fuel production under the lead-
ership of, andwith dedicated support from, high-income producing
countries. While contributing to the ‘guidance and signal’ function,
their lack of formalised processes for rule setting mean that such
initiatives do not count as international governance institutions for
current purposes. On the other hand, the Global Subsidies Initiative
(GSI), although a vehicle for NGOs, merits inclusion in this analysis
owing to its role providing targeted support, working with coun-
tries to implement reforms, and tracking G20 and APEC countries'
commitments in phasing out inefficient FFS (Lemphers et al., 2018).
Also noteworthy is the Powering Past Coal Alliance (PPCA),
launched by a hybrid mix of state and non-state actors
(Government of Canada, 2017). Whilst not strictly targeting
extraction per se, the Alliance's commitment to abandon coal
power-related investments has signalled that investments in
continuing production may be unwise.4. Assessing the governance complex
This section draws together evidence as to how well the set of
governance needs and potentials, summarised in Table 2, is being
met by current governance arrangements.Guidance and signal
Norms against continuing use (and, by extension, extraction) of
fossil fuels are strengthening and finding expression in a range of
fora. G7 countries' widely reported pledge to end all fossil fuel use
by the end of the century (Connolly, 2015), for example, appears
striking. With its ambitious long-term temperature targets, the PA
essentially amounts to the same commitment (Piggot et al., 2017).
However, the G7 has never signalled unambiguously any intent to
eliminate all fossil-fuel use, while the PA fails to mention fossil fuels
at all. Fossil fuel supply is not an explicit part of UNFCCC guidance
on developing Nationally Determined Contributions (NDCs);
neither are supply-side strategies a separate category in NDC syn-
thesis reports. This enables producers to remain ‘strategically
ignorant’ about the type and pace of change necessary (Piggot et al.,
2017: 9). The territorial approach followed by UNFCCC and IPCC in
their guidance on inventories is also problematic in failing to
recognise actions (such as restricting fossil fuel exports) that might
have an effect beyond a country's jurisdiction.
For its part, from as early as 2013 the IEA (and OECD) have issued
warnings related to ‘unburnable carbon’ in annual World Energy
Outlooks (see e.g. IEA, 2013). However, the Agency's main descrip-
tion of the future (until 2019 referred to as the ‘New Policies Sce-
nario’ - NPS), treated by energy decision-makers as the most likely
outcome and informing myriad investment decisions, implies up to
3.3 C of warming. In citing it to justify national investments de-
cisions (e.g. in Australian coal basins), decision makers risk
rendering this a self-fulfilling prophecy. Only latterly has the IEA
bowed to pressure and agreed to develop 1.5 C -compatible sce-
narios, and attach ‘health warnings’ to the NPS (McKinnon, 2019).
More positively, MDBs have begun highlighting the implications
of the PA in their contacts with emerging economy governments
dependent on fossil-fuel extractive industries.4 The Agreement is
therefore offering a signal of sorts, one that appears to be stronger4 EBRD representative at Fossil Fuel Supply Oxford conference, Sept 2018.
ng global governance for fossil-fuel supply reduction, Earth System
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announcements from the World Bank (2017), the European
Investment Bank (2019) and PPCA evidence a strengthening in
anti-fossil fuel norms. Citing temperature goals, theWBG has made
a series of significant decisions, including an end to finance for
upstream oil and gas projects after 2019. This built on previous
commitments to restrict public finance for coal projects. Less
positively, concerns have grown about the chilling signal sent by
the Energy Charter Treaty, the investor-state dispute settlement
provisions of which mean that corporations can potentially sue
governments for ‘loss of future profits’ (Eberhardt et al., 2018).
For FFS, guidance and signal is present in the aggregate of in-
stitutions and initiatives identified, but less definitively than it
might be. Specifically, the G20's 2009 compromise to target ‘inef-
ficient’ FFSs - echoed by the G7 (2016) - allows countries to define
the term narrowly; eight members deny operating such subsidies
(Asmelash, 2017) (see setting rules below).6 But following pressure
from the Friends of Fossil Fuel Subsidy Reform - a coalition of 9
states calling for the elimination of FFSs for climate policy reasons -
the signals emanating from theWTO have strengthened somewhat
since 2015. A Ministerial Statement advocating FFS reform has been
accepted (WTO, 2017). The (on-going) development of indicators
for the UNSDG Goal 12.c.1, which requires tracking of the ‘Amount
of fossil fuel subsidies per unit of GDP (production and consump-
tion) and as a proportion of total national expenditure on fossil
fuels’ adds further to the signal.
In terms of the need to share information about climate-related
investment risk, the G20's Task Force on Climate Related Financial
Disclosures has been in operation since 2015, but is essentially ad
hoc at time of this writing.
Overall, where the need for this function is high, the signal
offered by the governance complex as awhole, while strengthening
remains relatively weak, comprising either indirect signals (the PA
objectives and targets) or partial ones (PPCA, initiatives by MDBs).Rules to facilitate collective action
Global regulation of extraction rights, and the timing and
sequencing of their phase-out, are conspicuously absent from the
current regime complex. At best, the UNFCCC/PA offer a
permissive architecture within which governments can act and
receive corresponding recognition. For example, GHG reduction
policies could be accompanied by plans to reduce fossil fuel
production, expressed quantitatively through NDCs or Long-Term
Low-Greenhouse Gas Emission Development Strategies (LTS).
Countries could identify specific policy options, including
removal of subsidies.
In terms of the need to consider equity (and specifically the
issue of compensatory measures), no effort is currently being made
to decide on whether and when financial transfers might be justi-
fied, let alone providing for them. The Yasuni ITT initiative, under
which Ecuador asked for compensation for abstaining from oil
extraction in portions of a national park, failed to generate the
requested funding, while a related proposal for a ‘net avoided
emissions’ market mechanism under the UNFCCC did not find
favour either (Sovacool and Scarpaci, 2016).7 The UNFCCC's
(improved) forum on the ‘impact of the implementation of
response measures’ remains essentially a platform inwhich related
challenges can be discussed, but not necessarily resolved (UNFCCC,5 See Fn. 4.
6 See also G7 (2016), pledging to remove support for fossil fuels by 2025.
7 Funds raised would have supported social and environmental development
programs and the promotion of domestic renewable energy.
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adverse impact on developing countries, has drawn criticism
(FCCC/SB/2018/INF.4). For the time being, therefore, the activities in
this context are best viewed as contributing to the capacity build-
ing/means of implementation (and learning) functions (see below).
A shortcoming of intergovernmental agreements to eliminate
FFSs has been the lack of clear-cut commitments, including to
precise definitions (UNEP, 2019). As well as non-binding, commit-
ments have been vague and indefinite (although the G7 (2016) has
pledged to phase out ‘inefficient’ subsidies by 2025). No specific
bans or quantitative limits are in place. Furthermore, potentially
applicable WTO rules have not been invoked, and subsidies for
fossil fuel consumption and production have barely been raised in
that venue. Existing rules of the SCM Agreement appear to be
inadequate (Van Asselt, 2014). For a mixture of legal and political
reasons, no fossil-fuel subsidy has yet been challenged, and noti-
fication rates have generally been low (Casier et al., 2014; Van
Asselt, 2014).
In sum, governance needs in this case are onlyweaklymet;what
rules there are tend to be permissive and voluntary, rather than
mandatory. Urgently needed international rules to reduce the
supply of fossil fuels, and manage the distributional conflicts that
this would entail, are a long way from being negotiated, or indeed
even reaching the agenda.
Transparency and accountability
Given the absence of production-limiting rules, mechanisms to
ensure their transparent implementation are similarly absent.
What international institutions have managed to do is publish es-
timates of the scale of extraction. However, it would seem
reasonable to expect some institutional response to the need to
ensure the publication of more internationally comparable data
indicating the extent of FFS, and evaluation of how far commit-
ments to reduce subsidies are implemented.
On this, voluntary peer reviews conducted under G20 and APEC
auspices identify countries' ‘inefficient’ FFS. So far, the US, China,
Germany and Mexico have undergone this process. In themselves,
however, such mechanisms are unlikely to be sufficient to improve
transparency (Casier et al., 2014). Greater collaboration between
the OECD and the IEA has, however, enhanced transparency and
learning on the issue. For the first time, figures from these key IOs
have been combined (OECD, 2018), to suggest that FFS totalled at
least $373bn globally in 2015, and that while some developing
countries achieved reductions, developed country efforts have
slowed. Gaps in this OECD analysis remain, however, e.g. on credit
support. Moreover, more attention continues to be paid to con-
sumer rather than producer subsidies (Van Asselt, 2014). GSI's
assistance in tracking progress on G20 and APEC countries' com-
mitments through a dedicated website is significant. Furthermore,
adoption of SDG indicator 12.c.1 requiring the tracking of fossil fuel
subsudies represents progress.
Overall, while delivery of this function (specifically for FFS) is
improving, it remains inadequate.
Means of implementation
Beyond rhetorical commitments, the extent to which interna-
tional institutions are willing to support significant economic
transformations by fossil-fuel producer countries is not easily
determined. While the Global Environment Facility (GEF) and the
Green Climate Fund (GCF) operate to a general remit of supporting
decarbonisation (the former receiving mention in Article 4.8-
related decisions), no fund dedicated specifically to managed
decline of fossil-fuel extractive industries exists. Dissatisfactionng global governance for fossil-fuel supply reduction, Earth System
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reviewing and addressing adverse impacts of response measures
on trade-led development priorities (FCCC/SB/2018/INF.4) suggests
that the improved forum on ‘response measures’ has yet to fulfil its
potential.
By contrast, a continuing flow of ‘brown finance’ is rather easier
to identify. Despite their collective stance, individual G20 countries,
especially China, Japan, India and Korea, continue to finance over-
seas coal projects e by over $13 bn. in 2017, a five-year high (Chen,
2018). MDBs' fossil fuel-related funding exceeded $5bn in 2016
(Wright et al., 2018). Apart from the WBG, Wright et al. (2018)
found only two MDBs specifying strict conditions on coal mining
in their policies; others had no exclusions.
More positive has been the WBG's new partnership with
Canada and the International Trade Union Confederation (ITUC) to
provide analysis and support for developing countries' ‘just
transition’ from coal. The World Bank, among others, also assists
countries' subsidy reform efforts. On this, the IMF has the capa-
bility to include reform as a condition for lending. The GSI's tar-
geted support to countries implementing reforms is also
significant (Lemphers et al., 2018).
Overall, improvements in support offered by the World Bank for
‘just transitions’ from coal, and by various bodies building capacity
to implement subsidy reform, need to be weighed against the on-
going limitations of the ‘response measures’ track and continuing
flows of brown finance. There remains a significant shortfall in the
delivery of this governance function.
Knowledge and learning
In terms of the need to raise awareness of ‘unburnable carbon’
and stranded asset risks, the IPCC 1.5 C Special Report usefully
highlighted the scale of decline in investment in extraction and
conversion necessary. However, exclusion of explicit discussion of
this (politically highly sensitive) aspect from the summary for
policy makers reduced the potential to generate learning. Never-
theless, the request from 47 least developed countries for ‘man-
aging a phase out of fossil fuels’ to be included in the Talanoa
Dialogue (SEI, 2018), and the commitment from the IEA to present a
1.5C-compatible scenario, suggests the issues are gaining traction.
Similarly, the UNEP-led Production Gap report introduced a new
metric to measure consistency of production levels with climate
goals, raising awareness that by 2030, current plans will produce
120% more fossil fuels than would be consistent with limiting
warming to 1.5C (SEI et al., 2019).
In terms of promoting learning regarding the full costs of
existing development pathways and potential benefits of others,
institutions including the OECD, IEA, IMF, UNEP and the WBG have
usefully developed and shared relevant analyses. Knowledge
sharing among governments, through both public and confidential
channels, is occurring through the World Bank's Energy Sector
Management Assistance Programme (ESMAP). Similarly, the Bank's
Climate Action Peer Exchange convenes finance ministers to
discuss FFS reform. The UNFCCC response measures ‘improved
forum’ continues to facilitate interactive sharing of information,
experiences, case studies, etc.
Overall, the delivery of this function by the existing governance
complex is improving, but still falling short of the concerted effort
required to shift engrained attitudes. A clearer signal from
international-level institutions that the world is serious about
phasing out fossil fuel production is needed before learning efforts,
such as those outlined here, can make significant headway.Please cite this article as: Rayner, T., Keeping it in the ground? Assessi
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5.1. Serious governance gaps
The preceding analysis has thrown into stark relief the signifi-
cant and urgent need for the supply side of climate policy to be
addressed through cooperative international institutions. Without
this, any unilateral action by individual countries will not leave
sufficient resources ‘in the ground’ to secure long-term tempera-
ture goals. Strong signals regarding unburnable carbon, translated
into accepted rules, transparently applied, combined with support
for diversification and increased awareness of the benefits of
alternative development pathways, may all be regarded as high
priorities. Fulfilment of some functions is more urgent, however,
since others depend on them. Specifically, strong signals, particu-
larly to financial markets, can raise awareness of the danger of
stranded assets and prompt coordinated measures to deflate the
apparent carbon bubble. This should facilitate efforts among elites
in particularly vulnerable producer states to learn new approaches
to development by which national interests can be secured more
sustainably.
The analysis has also found that these governance needs, for the
most part, have yet to be addressed meaningfully by existing in-
ternational institutions. The UNFCCC and PA, in particular, leave
troubling gaps, to a large extent reflecting political-economic fac-
tors which keep fossil fuel production largely off-limits to policy
makers. Production-related incentives derive largely from market
signals, not policy. It is also evident that the fragmented global
climate and energy governance architecture gives rise to in-
consistencies and trade-offs between different institutions' objec-
tives, with no arbiter to manage them. Conflicting objectives may
also occur within single institutions, particularly those, such as the
IEA, whose remit encompasses the so-called energy ‘trilemma’ of
decarbonisation, energy security and affordability.
Governance challenges associated with deciding what carbon
should be designated ‘unburnable’, and managing the equity con-
cerns and related geo-political conflicts (corresponding to rule
setting andmeans of implementation functions), are far from being
fully recognised and grappled with. While some governance func-
tions are closer to being fulfilled, they generally relate to FFS re-
form. The various institutions most involved in phasing out
‘inefficient’ subsidies (G20, IEA, OECD) can be considered to (indi-
rectly) target fossil fuel development in a worthwhile manner.
However, most of their initiatives consist of enhancing trans-
parency, rather than developing and implementing concrete
reductionmeasures, andmost attention has been paid to consumer,
not producer subsidies. Moreover, the importance of FFS reform
should be kept in perspective: as Newell and Johnstone (2018: 27)
phrase it, “wemight prune the branches and dead leaves with fossil
fuel subsidy reform, but the trunk of the tree (or the fossil fuel
economy) could remain sturdy…“.
5.2. Towards a more adequate governance response
Comprehensively addressing the governance gaps identified
would require an overhaul of global political economic forces of
utopian proportions. However, a number of possible reforms have
potential to act in a more modest and partial way. In the following,
some of these are identified, governance function by function,
paying particular attention to implications for the UNFCCC and G20.
It is also worth noting that the prospects for such proposals would
be enhanced inmany cases if heavy, well-financed lobbying activityng global governance for fossil-fuel supply reduction, Earth System
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curtailed. Here, the World Health Organisation's success in
restricting tobacco industry involvement in negotiations under the
Framework Convention on Tobacco Control (FCTC) may offer some
inspiration (Gerasimchuk and Bacchus, 2017).
Guidance and signal
In principle, the G7 could makemore explicit what many took to
be a fossil-fuel phase-out commitment in 2015, with a shorter time
frame. Obviously, this would require a new set of political in-
cumbents in associated national capitals. The same could be said of
the G20 more explicitly signalling FFS phase-out by a firm deadline,
ideally in conjunction with a political declaration from the WTO.
Further potential exists for the G20 to improve guidance and in-
formation regarding stranded asset risks to financial markets,
reminding oil majors, for example, of the urgency of diversification.
Engagement and global economic leadership of the G20 (whose
membership usefully combines key fossil fuel producer countries
with low-carbon transition leaders), would appear to be a pre-
requisite for safe handling of the carbon bubble. One possibility is
for the Task Force on Climate Related Financial Disclosures to
become permanent, and to produce regular reports (Goldthau,
2017). Exploiting the UNFCCC's still un-tapped potential to help
governments articulate fossil-fuel phase-down pathways and ac-
tions could help in ‘ratcheting’ countries' mitigation ambition. At
the very least, supply-side actions could feature more explicitly in
NDC development guidelines, and as a separate category in syn-
thesis reports (Piggot et al., 2017). Indicating more clearly that FFS
reform can be part of a country's mitigation portfolio would in-
crease the likelihood that such actions can be eligible for support,
for example capacity building (Van Asselt and Kulovesi, 2017).
As noted above, the established territorial approach to ac-
counting for emissions signals that supply-side actions (having
extra-territorial effect) are not relevant. An alternative extraction-
based emissions accounting framework could help monitor the
alignment of fossil fuel supply with climate goals, thereby sending a
more appropriate signal. Given that the development of a stand-
ardised methodology and capacity for territorial emissions ac-
counting has been hard-won, an extraction-based system should
probably be established in parallel (Piggot et al., 2017).
Rules for collective action
Despite decision-making responsibility ultimately resting with
sovereign states, urgent consideration needs to be given to deter-
mining how the development benefits of fossil-fuel resources can
be optimised within a 1.5C-consistent carbon budget. Given that
the timing and sequencing of supply constraints has potential to
leavewhole countries ‘stranded’, wheremight rules informing such
momentous decision making (potentially involving compensation)
legitimately be agreed?
As the central, dedicated forum for addressing climate change,
the UNFCCC is well-placed, in principle, particularly with its near-
universal participation (compared with other international en-
ergy or trade organisations), including both fossil fuels consuming
and producing states (Van Asselt, 2014). As already noted, the PA
offers a framework through which, in principle, countries could
voluntarily articulate pathways away from fossil fuels. There is
certainly untapped potential for the improved forum on response
measures to address such questions. During the 2018 Talanoa
process, the concept of a moratorium on new coal mines, poten-
tially implemented through a ‘fossil-fuel non-proliferation treaty’
received some publicity (Newell and Simms, 2019). Arguably
however, with the UNFCCC already over-burdened, such a treaty
should be negotiated as a separate entity, with its own accounting
and redistributive mechanisms, potentially linked to the GCF (ibid).Please cite this article as: Rayner, T., Keeping it in the ground? Assessi
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Furthermore, Ecuador's Yasuni ITT experience suggests caution
regarding putative global-level compensatory mechanisms.
Given the tendency of multilateral efforts to gridlock, mini-
lateral ‘coalitions of the willing’ could potentially move first with
rules of their own. Such initiatives could become more compre-
hensive in coverage once the need for supply-side interventions
becomes more widely appreciated. For example, a moderate export
tax coordinated among the four largest (steam) coal exporters,
Indonesia, Australia, South Africa and Colombia, could bring them
net economic benefits, as well as reducing emissions (Richter et al.,
2015). The resultant rise in traded coal prices would reduce con-
sumption, while the billions of dollars potentially raised annually
could fund structural transition in mining regions, and/or R&D. In
principle at least, even OPEC members could apply a carbon tax to
their exports, earmarking revenues for the GCF (Vidal, 2012) or for
their own diversification efforts. In advance of more comprehensive
international rules being agreed, both equity and economic effi-
ciency rationales speak in favour of wealthy, historically polluting
countries moving first to forgo the exploitation of particularly high-
cost, carbon-intensive fossil fuels, such as deep-sea oilfields
(Lenferna, 2018). Tying such initiatives to Paris goals would make
more explicit the need for other countries to address supply issues
(Piggot et al., 2017).
New multilateral rules for FFS are easier to envisage, although
here too consensus on the most appropriate formulator and
enforcer, or whether rules can feasibly be the subject of a dedicated
multilateral agreement, has not yet emerged (Smith and
Urpelainen, 2017). However, an important opportunity clearly ex-
ists for the WTO, the only body with a definition of subsidies tried
and tested through vigorous negotiation. Adoption of a new
multilateral agreement on subsidies or trade remedies, within the
WTO framework, is conceivable, along with a range of other pos-
sibilities (Espa and Rolland, 2015).
Transparency and accountability
Regarding transparency of FFS, while several IOs and NGOs have
developed their own data repositories of support measures, greater
coordination could increase their policy impact (OECD, 2018),
especially as inconsistencies in definitions and data have been used
as excuses to postpone action. There is significant potential for the
WTO to enhance transparency without changes in its legal frame-
work (Van Asselt, 2014; Casier et al., 2014), including e.g. a new
notification template providing further details on subsidies in a
standardised fashion.
Means of implementation
The process by which countries and regions at risk of ‘stranding’
diversify along alternative development paths requires careful
analysis and complex international negotiation and coordination,
extending beyond conventional climate policy channels to
encompass development cooperation and governance of finance.
While the UNFCCC and the G20 are both strong candidates to
oversee this, each would require an overhaul to be credible and
legitimate leaders.
The UNFCCC's response measures forum in particular has
obvious further potential to facilitate assistance with transition
(FCCC/SB/2018/INF.4: page 7). Similarly, the Paris Committee on
Capacity Building could expand to include tools and support for
more supply-focused actions (Piggot et al., 2017). In time, the GCF
and GEF could become more active in channelling transition-
related funds as part of their wider finance role. In principle this
could be connected to fund-raising mechanisms mentioned in the
discussion of rules for collective action, above, agreed by the
UNFCCC or elsewhere. More realistically in the short term, rules tong global governance for fossil-fuel supply reduction, Earth System
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funds to finance such transitions (Merrill et al., 2017).
Given its role facilitating cooperation on climate-related finan-
cial risk and green finance, the G20 could encourage dialogue be-
tween its own members (and potentially other key donors), MDBs
and international organisations, and developing countries, with the
objective of better coordinating development assistance to pro-
ducer states embarking on transition (Bradley et al., 2018;
Goldthau, 2017). ‘Non-traditional’ donors will need to be engaged,
including emerging economies and their export-import banks,
OPEC, Arab and Islamic development banks, as well as philan-
thropic trusts and export credit agencies. Sovereign wealth funds
have been underutilized as sources of capital, but may be possible
to mobilise in a more coordinated way to boost investment in non-
extractive sectors. Without such wide-ranging participation,
assistance from different actors may support conflicting develop-
ment models (Bradley et al., 2018).
Knowledge and learning
Although not featuring in current negotiations, the PA's Global
Stocktake could in principle include an assessment of fossil fuel
supply, in relation to temperature goals. Arguably, seizing this op-
portunity is a matter of urgency (Piggot et al., 2017). The concepts of
un-burnable carbon and stranded asset risks need to become much
more widely discussed in development policy fora and processes at
UN level, including SDGs, UNEP Green Economy & Finance Initia-
tives, donor forums such as OECD, Sustainable Energy for All, etc.
Awareness-raising by the International Labour Organisation (ILO,
2015) and international trade unions, already under-way, has po-
tential to go much further (ITUC, 2015).
Greater recognition for countries’ supply-side actions through
UNFCCC institutions would serve to enable debate and discussion
about whether such commitments are fair and ambitious, and
reduce chances of policy reversal (Piggot et al., 2017). Greater
recognition of supply-side aspects in the NAZCA portal could
encourage further efforts by non-state/non-Party actors. For
example, BP has announced a scaling back of exploration and
willingness to leave some assets unrecovered (Holder, 2019).
To begin more serious discussion within the fossil-fuel sectoral
system itself, a project task force in the OECD Policy Dialogue on
Natural Resource-based Development could offer a suitable forum for
evidence-based deliberations and formulation of recommenda-
tions (Schl€osser et al., 2017). Awareness could be improved if
transboundary impact assessment of large-scale energy related
projects, explicitly integrating previously unrecognized social-
environmental impacts and injustices, were made mandatory at
global level (Healy et al., 2019).
5.3. Outlook
This paper has noted how restricting the international supply of
fossil fuels is increasingly acknowledged to be necessary if long-
term global temperature goals are to be achieved, but how
immense barriers to imposing such restrictions remain. In theory, a
managed decline in supply could be facilitated by international
cooperation, through a range of currently existing or proposed new
institutions. In practice, however, despite some rhetorical com-
mitments, in the face of concerns over fiscal stability, equity, and
geo-political tensions, adequate international institutional re-
sponses have not been forthcoming.
Nevertheless, as impacts visibly worsen, as fossil fuel market
volatility likely increases, and as shifts in public opinion allow key
governments to think more boldly, more radical proposals for in-
ternational cooperation, of the kind highlighted in this article, may
begin to receive a fairer hearing. The UN Secretary General'sPlease cite this article as: Rayner, T., Keeping it in the ground? Assessi
Governance, https://doi.org/10.1016/j.esg.2020.100061declaration in November 2019 that ‘we simply have to stop digging
and drilling’ (Reuters, 2019) testifies to a shift in policy discourse,
and gives it significant further impetus at an international as well as
national level. Future research can fruitfully examine further how
principles of just transition away from fossil-fuel dependence could
be, and are, being elaborated and institutionalised in a new, multi-
level political context.
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